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ABSTRACT
Using a case study approach, this article examines the shifting dimensions of
Qatar’s international relations strategies with select, geo-politically important
African states, including primarily the latter’s private sector and civil society,
and focusing on the current or potential use of soft power in particular. To
start, this article presents a comprehensive overview of soft power, including
its international relations theory-based historical origins; definitional
boundaries; associated tools and mechanisms; and the concept’s pragmatic
problems and limitations. Second, the article offers several best practice case
studies, including the United Kingdom and China, from which core lessons
on soft power development and application can be gleaned. This will advance
from a list of seven key lessons that any prospective soft power state should
consider. Following this, the article engages in an examination of available
evidence outlining Qatar’s attempted soft power action on the African continent
and, particularly in Sudan, Somalia, Mali and Tunisia, arguing that it relies
extensively on “carrotdiplomacy” or the influencing of others backed by
material and financial resource inducements. Finally, five problems and
roadblocks affecting Qatar’s approach to international relations will be
presented, followed by alternative (soft) power-based strategies, which could
be explored by its government and leadership.




The 1940s and 1950s mark a beginning of the concept of state-driven
power, a hallmark of the political science and international relations
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debate. Indeed, an understanding of power differentiates much of the
theoretical ground within this field. In the view of Hans Morgenthau,
the concept of power must continue to be the theoretical core of
international politics as, in his view, all politics is a struggle for power.1
This perspective is derived from his understanding that the desire to
dominate is a constitutive element of all human associations, thus
indicating that international pressure and geopolitics is simply a struggle
between independent units seeking to maximize their own power so
as to control others.2
In a global society, however, where much has changed since the
writings of Morgenthau, can we truly continue to proceed down the
conceptually limited intellectual path? As Barnett and Duvall argue,
our perspective of international relations and elements within it is
primarily guided by a realist’s conception of power – the ability of
states to use material resources to get others to do what they otherwise
might not.3
Using a case study approach, this article will examine the shifting
dimensions of Qatar’s international relations strategies with select,
geopolitically important African states, including primarily the latter’s
private sector and civil society; while focusing on the current or potential
use of soft power in particular. Put another way, this article will ask
whether soft power, as a multidimensional concept, with a variety of
theoretical and normative understandings, can help (and, specifically,
how) in achieving or furthering Qatari business interests and foreign
policy objectives on the African continent.
Tostart, this article presents a comprehensive overview of soft power,
including its international relations theory-based historical origins,
definitional boundaries, associated tools and mechanisms, and the
concept’s pragmatic problems and limitations. Secondly, the article
presents several best practice case studies, including the United
Kingdom, which has been consistently ranked as a leading soft power,
as has been China. Thirdly, to build further from those cases, a list of
seven key lessons that any prospective soft power state should consider
is provided. Delving deeper into the Qatari example, this country will
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be shown to have back stopped its emerging international power as a
small Gulf State with substantial hard economic resources. Equally,
Qatar’s extensive soft power toolset will be analysed, denoting the
country’s efforts to build for itself an attractive brand abroad as a means
of persuading targeted states to come closer to it.
Sequel to this, the article engages in an examination of available
evidence outlining Qatar’s attempted soft power action on the African
continent, particularly in Sudan, Somalia, Mali and Tunisia, arguing
that it relies extensively on “carrotdiplomacy” or influencing others
backed by material and financial resource inducements. Finally, five
problems and roadblocks affecting Qatar’s approach to international
relations will be presented, followed by alternative (soft) power-based
strategies, which could be explored by its government and leadership.
2.  SOFT POWER
2.1 Historically Realist
Perhaps the most appropriate place to start a definition of soft power
is to identify what it actually is not. Traditional notions of power,
primarily derived from the realist school of international relations
scholarships, focused on an entity’s ability to dominate and control.
Waltz, in his Theory of International Politics, describes the international
system as one source in a balance of power theory. This theory assumes
that states, at a minimum level, seek their own preservation and, at a
maximum, drive for ultimate domination.4 Waltz argues that this could
be achieved internally by increasing economic power or military
strength and, externally, by increasing the forces associated with one’s
own alliances while weakening that of an opposing state.5 Even with
the advent of nuclear weapons and a strategy of deterrence between
the former Soviet Union and the United States, Waltz maintained that,
in the international system, military force as power had hardly lost its
meaning or usefulness.6  For Hart, there are several components of such
a measurement of state power, namely, control over resources, including
4 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politic (Long Grove: Waveland Press
Inc., 1979), 117.
5 ibid.
6 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of the International System” (1993)
18(2) International Security, 53.
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military expenditure; the size of armed forces; the gross national product
and population; control over actors or, in the words of Dahl, the ability
of A to get B to do something that he would otherwise not do; and
control over events and their outcomes.7 Interestingly, Hart leaves open
the possibility of control in the second case, as it could either stem
from coercion, namely military; or persuasion aptly termed influence.8
This distinction will become critically important in the coming pages,
for soft power largely rests on the latter.
In a situation of international anarchy, which realists classically
identified as pervasive among states, force is seen as an integral part of
foreign policy because military power can be used both forcefully and
peacefully.9 The latter comprises threats to harm, cripple or destroy
but not to actually do so while the former operates in the physical
sense, whereby state A harms or destroys the possessions of state B.10
In both cases, however, power is related directly to a state’s ability to
cause militarily damage to another state. Hart continues by arguing
that force, such as military power, is integral to statecraft because
international politics is inherently anarchical.11 To achieve their own
designated policy objectives and interests, this perspective argues that
coercion, persuasion or influence, as Hart notes above, is fundamentally
ineffective without hard power backing or the threat of such power.
2.2 Determining the Boundaries of Soft Power
With this in mind, what then might constitute notions of soft power?
It is generally agreed that Joseph Nye coined the term in the early
1990s, first in his book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American
Power, and then elaborated upon it in subsequent works. Nye observes
that, as we saw above, the traditional test of a great power was its
strength in war but, today, that definition of power that emphasizes
military force and conquest has been losing its validity due to
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unconventional threats and transnational, borderless issues.12 Proof of
the power of this doctrine comes not from a state’s measurable
resources, but in its ability to change the behaviour of states in general.13
It would appear now that the direct use of hard, material force for
economic and positional gainis generally too costly and dangerous for
modern hegemonic powers.14 Nye argues that this is specifically due to
five major trends, namely increased economic interdependence between
states powered by revolutions in information; communications and
transportation technology; the rise of transnational actors who
predominantly exert influence by effecting the ways in which national
interests are originally defined by policy-makers; a social awakening
that has stirred nationalism in developing states, which limits the
capacity for external actors to apply military force; the spread of modern
technology, which enhanced the capabilities of those same developing
states; and the increasing transnational nature of political, economic,
security and cultural issues in world politics, which require multilateral
responses.15
The changes noted suggest a variation in the way of exercising
power beyond traditional means, including the hegemonic control of
natural resources and territorial conquest, which Nye terms as soft
power – a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics
because other states, who admire its values, emulate its examples and
aspire to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it.16 Soft
power co-opts rather than coerces others – it has the ability to shape
their preferences.17 It is not merely the same thing as influence, however,
as influence can also rest on the hard power of threats, attacks and
payments.18 Rather, Nye firmly believes that soft power is, in behavioural
terms, the power of attraction and example, facilitated by material
resources.19 In later texts, Nye clarifies this division between influence
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and attraction, commenting that, while soft power is not just the former,
it is still a source of influence.20
Since Nye, others have sought to adjust this definition of soft power
in the face of changes to both states and the world system at large. In
the context of China, its government tends to enunciate a broader idea
of soft power – one which means anything outside of the military and
security realms, including not only pop culture and public diplomacy,
but also more “coercive economic and diplomatic levers” like aid,
investment and participation in multilateral organizations.21 Kurlantzick
equally adds to the definition by differentiating between soft power,
which is directed “high” at a country’s eliteor “low” at its general
public.22 This reflects an important point noted by Codevilla whereby
soft power does not necessarily have universal applicability in a targeted
state. Rather, different parts of populations are attracted or repelled by
varied ideas, images and prospects.23
2.3 Tools and Mechanisms of Soft Power
Nye believed that it is via the instrument of public diplomacy that soft
power is diffused abroad.24 Public diplomacy is divided by the author
into two categories: namely broadcasting or the diffusion of particular
information so as to enhance a country’s reputation and image; and
action with states opting to employ physical resources abroad in order
to develop their own state “brand”.25 It tries to attract, influence and
persuade by drawing attention to these potential soft power resources,
via broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports and arranging exchanges.26
Thus, public diplomacy is inherently related to the mantra of
“information as power” because, as information and communication
technologies (ICT) continue to expand dramatically with advances in
20 Joseph S Nye Jr, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power” (2008) 616 The ANNALS
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 95.
21 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming
the World(New York: Caravan Books, 2007) 6.
22 ibid.
23 Angela M Codevilla, “Political Warfare: A Set of Means for Achieving Political
Ends” in J Michael Waller (ed), Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counter-
propaganda and Political Warfare(Washington: Institute of World Politics Press,
2007) 214.
24 Nye (n 17)95.
25 ibid 102, 104.
26 ibid.
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both technology and reach, the ability for a state to unilaterally control
its own reputation and credibility becomes diminished.27 States, in
short, have to find the means of swimming against what could be a
current of bad publicity derived from multiple mediums, so as to gain
related soft power.
The tools and mechanisms of soft power, which would allow a
state to combat the above bad publicity, rest on three resources that a
country may or may not possess. These are its culture, political values
and foreign policies.28 Starting with the first resource, when a country’s
culture includes universal values and its policies promote those values,
traditions and interests that other states may share, the probability of
obtaining the desired outcomes increases.29  As a consequence, narrow
cultural values are unlikely to produce soft power.30  The tools of cultural
transmission, as a means of generating that soft power, are said to
include commerce, personal contacts, visits and exchanges (including
overseas education) between state elite, and government policies at
home and abroad.31 As an example of the latter, during the 1950s,
American soft power was curtailed in Africa due to racial segregation
policies at home.32 This represents what could be considered a hard and
fast rule of soft power: Domestic and foreign policies that appear to be
hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others or based on a
narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power.33
It is equally important to recall that, unlike hard power, whereby
the state traditionally has a monopoly on the use of force, soft power
is diffuse – meaning that, while the government may be espousing
particular policies or perspectives, public and private sources can
simultaneously be working at cross purposes.34 States can develop soft
power simply by paying attention to others, listening and participating
in international forums or engaging with foreign states in dialogue.35
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In a more direct manner, states can gain soft power via the provision of
humanitarian assistance, economic assistance via official development
assistance (ODA) or foreign direct investment, as well as via diplomatic
endeavours.36
Additional research pointed to alternative tools or mechanisms,
which could be used to generate soft power. Matlary echoes Nye by
citing diplomacy but adds the need for the building of interdependence
rather than confrontation as a means of doing so.37 Gill and Huang
argue that the establishment of cultural education organizations, like
the Confucius Institute from China, could assist in projecting a particular
image of a state abroad, while the facilitation of tourism – both inbound
and outbound – can do the same.38 For Turkey, soft power was derived
from its increasing eagerness to play the role of third party mediator
and manager in the resolution of regional conflict.39 Each of these
examples provides information crucial to our discussion of the potential
for Qatar to become a soft power leader – in the Gulf Region itself –
but also in areas targeted by its foreign policy and, more especially, the
African continent.
2.4 Best Practices – The United Kingdom
In 2012, the United Kingdom (UK) was ranked first on the Institute
for Government-Monocle’s Soft Power Index, a composite measurement
framework based on five pillars, namely government or the
attractiveness of a state’s model of governance; culture, when a country
promotes universal values that others identify with and find attractive;
diplomacy or the global footprint of a state; the impact of education
and related activities; and business/innovation as a measurement of
the relative attractiveness of a country’s economic model, including its
terms of openness, capacity for innovation and quality of its regulation.40
36 ibid 14-15.
37 Haaland Matlary Janne, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic
Culture Possible?” (2006) 37(1), Security Dialogue 107.
38 Gill Bates & Yanzhoug Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power’”
(2007) 48(2) Survival, 18-20.
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The UK had slipped only one position, by 2013.41 Therefore, as a
relatively stable soft power, as reviewed by one of the few metrics
regarding this, what best practices can we glean from the UK, which
can then be analysed with reference to our proceeding Qatari case
study?
The United Kingdom’s Select Committee on Soft Power conducted
a comprehensive survey in 2014 on the country’s soft power best
practices, both in terms of the resources outlined above and the
mechanisms for diffusing them. The Committee’s principal conclusion
was the recognition that innovative diplomacy is key to soft power.
The UK has a substantial international presence, with embassies
transitioning into “super-facilitators” of British business and civil society
with the outside world.42 Secondly, they recognized that their armed
forces, as mechanisms of hard power, were also ambassadors for soft
power, acting as the immediate face of British foreign policy and thus
requiring them to have an in-depth understanding of the political and
cultural environment in which they operate.43 Thirdly, the government
traditionally invested substantial material resources into international
humanitarian efforts, primarily via their well-recognized Department
for International Development.44Linking the latter closely to British
values, many of which coincide with what Nye would describe as
universal values, the organization becomes a mechanism of attraction
and persuasion – not propaganda.
Fourthly, the UK worked to promote itself as a veritable hub for
extra-governmental bodies and organizations, as well as an array of
international and regional institutions and organizations, resulting in
many of them establishing their headquarters in London and other
British cities.45 These civil society groups add to the country’s reputation
via their international focus, while simultaneously acting as direct
linkages between the UK’s normative values and societies abroad.46 It
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is argued that, becoming a hub for a multitude of international
organizational, civil society and cultural networks, allows a country to
shape the preferences, debates, procedures, rules and, ultimately,
outcomes of decisions they do not necessarily control outright.47
The Select Committee observes that the British Monarchy is itself
a vessel of soft power influence, with Queen Elizabeth II having made
over 260 official visits to 116 different countries during her reign.48
The Monarchy acts as a symbol of long-term continuity in government,
as a hallmark of collaboration between Republicans and royalty, as
well as a champion of British values.49At home, tourism by foreign
visitors amounts to a significant soft power tool. By promoting the UK
as an overseas travel destination, including hosting large-scale events
like the 2012 Olympic Games, visitors become vessels via which the
desired image of the state is transmitted back home.50 A seventh best
practice adds to this: Regarding education, the UK invested considerable
energy into two-way scholarship programmes, international research
collaboration opportunities and English language education abroad.51
Qatar has an opportunity to learn from these best practices of soft
power and has already done so in several areas that will be detailed
below. No one particular area of influence is sufficient to achieve
meaningful soft power influence; therefore, all must be sustained and
cultivated. In this regard, the same Select Committee report determined
that after 2012, the UK had forgotten and neglected several of its soft
power institutions; funding to the BBC World Service was cut; and
rather narrow debates were held on the future of immigration and
immigrant population within the UK, thereby damaging the country’s
image, reputation and persuasive capacity abroad.52
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3.  LIMITS AND PROBLEMS
Exploring the difficulties and limitations of soft power influence
encountered by other states helps generate several key lessons, which
Qatar should follow or, at the very least, be wary of in its pursuit of
greater soft power influence internationally. Beginning with Nye, the
author argues that it is necessary to be sensitive in this regard when
soft power might actually function, in that its effectiveness is never
guaranteed as uniform across all states at all times. He notes that
popular culture is more likely to produce soft power in situations where
cultures between two states are similar rather than dissimilar.53 Equally,
attraction might have a diffuse effect, creating a general influence that
may or may not ultimately result in a situation of soft power, rather
than the production of an easily observable specific action.54 This
statement reaffirms Nye’s caution that soft power, like hard power, has
no guarantee of any results. While soft power can sometimes have a
direct impact on specific goals, it is more likely to have an influence on
the general goals (or “milieu goals”) that a country seeks, such as
brand recognition or increasing international prestige and position.55
In a study published by the United Kingdom’s House of Lords Select
Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, testimonial witnesses
pointed to difficulties associated with what is termed soft power
propaganda. When a government body, actor or institution unilaterally
commandeers the control of a cultural mechanism, such as a film
production, this action could limit the mechanism’s interpretative range
and thereby trivializes it, tarnishing the reputation of that mechanism
and its operators and removing its ability to strengthen a state’s soft
power.56 Equally, the Select Committee mirrors concerns of Nye and
others that soft power is difficult to measure and is largely intangible.57
As such, it would seem that the quantitative evaluation of soft power
remains an obstacle in terms of pragmatic application by policy-makers.
The Select Committee points to an equally important facet of soft
power, namely that it is inherently bound to communication. While
the United Kingdom, as this study highlights, may intend to
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communicate a particular message to an audience, the mantra that
attraction is in the eye of the beholder will likely remain true, in that
the state will often be powerless to control what exactly is attractive
about it to others.58 Communication is also a bidirectional process. A
principal failure of soft power strategies is when the originating country
is neither interested in, nor sufficiently flexible to adapt to, the
responses it receives for its actions and messages abroad.59 Attraction
is also affected by what Emile Simpson describes as a say-do gap,
whereby the message received by an audience regarding a state does
not match the reality that those citizens face.60
As an additional example of the limits of soft power, China is being
faced with three major hindrances to its effective use. Firstly, it is
confronted by an imbalance in soft power resources. While economic
growth served as an engine for China’s emergence onto the world stage
over the past several decades, it was not paralleled by the availability
of the “attractive ingredients”, which are essential to a soft power
recipe, including failure to market itself; a lack of research and
innovation in business; limited human development and political
freedom; and rampant party corruption – all of which tarnish its image
abroad.61 Secondly, China faces a legitimacy problem, in that its strategic
relationships with dictatorships in the developing world, coupled with
a lack of meaningful political reform at home, limits its soft power
influence and attractiveness.62
According to Nye, states are more likely to endanger greater soft
power resources in the information age when they are seen to project
ideals, which challenge global norms, including liberalism, pluralism
and autonomy.63 Evidently, this statement invokes questions of cultural
relativity of those so-called global norms and, indeed, it is possible
that Beijing may have realized a greater soft power towards those
countries that are less westernized and less democratic – according to
subjective Western standards. Lacking the ability to influence and
persuade the West does not necessary amount to a conjunctive lack in
soft power. Instead, it could point to a different target audience. Looking
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at Qatar’s foreign policy objectives below reveals how we can remove
this theoretical weakness by identifying whom we wish to influence.
Finally, China is argued to have significant policy incoherence, which
prevents it from advancing a benign and attractive image to others.64
Bates and Huang argue that problems with internal economic and policy-
making consistency may partially account for the reason why China
has not yet been able to reap significant gains in liberal democracies –
even at a time of softening US prestige.65 Qatar would do well to take
note of the difficulties and limitations of soft power as outlined above.
Indeed, these cases, with their examples of failure and limitation, help
support this article’s generation of eight key soft power lessons, which
should be pursued if Qatar (and others) hopes to adjust and change
the interests and actions of others, namely, it is necessary to:
1. Target soft power towards the achievement of general goals,
rather than to expect the realization of specific objectives.
2. Be conscious of, and engage in, reconciliation processes
regarding historical difficulties, as the latter may contribute
to the destabilization of even diffuse cultural and normative
influence.
3. Balance soft power resources.
4. Identify one’s target audience and their associated global
norms, because directing action towards a country with similar
normative and ideational characteristics is more likely to be
effective than towards those that are dissimilar.
5. Follow a policy of bidirectional communication, in that a
country’s soft power strategy remains malleable to signals
from “influences”.
6. Ensure foreign policy coherence, so as to instil a sense of
purpose and stability in any observers.
7. Recall that soft power is largely a subjective and relative
interpretation of the influence and persuasion that a state
has abroad, owing to the difficulties of its quantitative
measurement.
8. Recall that soft power is one of many power variants that a
state can employ in order to achieve its goals. Soft power
itself can equally be considered as an umbrella category for
64 ibid  29.
65 ibid  30.
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other brands of power, including subtle power, smart power
and normative power. As such, soft power can never be
completely bound by a single definitional explanation.
3.1 Soft Power and Qatar: A Case of
Improving on Success
So far, we have established some basic information on soft power,
including its definition; mechanisms and tools for using it; best practices
pioneered by other states; various expected results and associated
problems and limitations; as culminated in our list of eight lessons.
The next section will analyse our case study of Qatar, including its
broad foreign policy goals and stated soft power objectives; its
relationship with particular African states; Qatar’s own mechanisms
for soft power influence, demonstrated via shifting modes of
engagement with its partners; the results of its influence and persuasive
strategies; as well as associated problems.
4.  FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
There are at least five motivations behind Qatar’s foreign policy. We
demonstrate below that the foreign policy arguably lacks in genuine
coherence but largely reflects Kamravian’s argument that traditional
conceptions of power are no longer adequate to engage with emerging
trends, shaping the international system.66A state’s foreign policy can
tell us much about its intended use of soft power tools and the place
of those tools within its approach to international relations. First, is
the maintenance of the country’s own security and stability.67 Qatar is
located in an area rife with political and military rivalries. Increasing
its international profile is directed at preventing the perils of small-
state anonymity and, in particular, a lack of outside awareness of it or
relevant impacting issues.68 Second, in building its reputation as an
effective mediator of conflict, Qatar not only contributes to its first aim
by preventing the spillover of regional violence, but it seeks to expand
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its influence as an international player, vis-à-vis Egypt and Saudi Arabia.69
Third, Qatar, seeks to appeal to, and leverage the international
community, branding itself as a key international ally and a potential
host state for global economic activities and businesses.70 Fourth, the
state’s foreign policy has been largely influenced by Qatari approaches
to sovereign wealth management,71 as well as the maximization of its
profits from natural resources, in order to achieve domestic
development.72 Fifth and, most recently, observers suggested that Qatar
had begun to turn away from self-described “arrogant policies” of
absolute support for regional Islamist groups and revolutions, signalling
a softening in foreign policy goals and a turning to a brand of a neutral
mediator.73
Qatar’s breakthrough into the international system during the 1990s
to the mid-2000s is largely credited to its increasingly pervasive role
as one of the world’s most active mediators of conflict – both in the
Middle East and in Africa.74 Mediation serves both broad and specific
foreign policy objectives. States, such as Qatar, regard mediation as a
viable strategy with lower costs than standing by as conflict rages. It
also serves as a mechanism for branding Qatar as an international actor
and regional powerhouse with a proven public diplomacy track record.75
Rather than being a tool of diplomacy, Qatar sees mediation as
“diplomacy itself”, within a broader framework of strategic action in
both international and domestic political systems.76 Exemplifying this
69 ibid  419.
70 Ibid 419- 420.
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is its interesting, informal open-door type policy of hosting competing
and combative factions and groups from abroad, such as Israel and
Hamas.77 Kamrava argues that, as a relatively new participant in
international relations generally, emerging prominently only during
the past two decades, Qatar is in the unique position of being free
from the accumulated baggage of competitors and neighbours, namely
Saudi Arabia and/or Egypt.78 Indeed, it may have the capacity to invoke
what the author calls subtle power, or the careful balancing of military,
cultural and smart power, which allow Qatar to make major, bold and
brash foreign policy choices far easier than it would be expected from
such a small state.79
As recently as 2013, commentators suggested that, while Qatar
had been praised for astute public diplomacy and its ability to act as
an effective conflict mediator, its foreign policy did not appear to be
based on a single coherent political strategy.80 The result, according to
Khatib, was that, despite some success, Qatar is impacted upon by a
discrepancy between image and action. Indeed, with recent shifts in
leadership in Qatar (e.g. the replacement of its Foreign Minister), the
country appears to be moving away from high-risk, high-visibility foreign
policy towards a more conservative approach,81 in spite of official signals
from leadership regarding “continuity” in the state’s approach to
international relations.82 That said, such a shift may not necessarily
represent a haphazard and incoherent approach to foreign policy by
Qatar, but rather a return to its former efforts of developing an image
and reputation as a mediator, public diplomacy practitioner and stable
domestic hub for global affairs, but without any of the earlier
associations with foreign policy extremes.
4.1 Soft Power Objectives and Definitions
With its emphasis on image branding, particularly as a foreign policy
objective in itself, the emphasis that Qatar places on soft power in the
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international system is becoming evident. Peterson argues that few
countries have taken the lessons and importance of branding more to
heart than did Qatar, which approached this strategy from multiple
directions.83 The author suggests that it has identified itself as distinct
from the Gulf Cooperation Council, an organization with which it has
a long history of association, and has raised international awareness
of itself by hosting large global meetings and conferences and increasing
its participation in external alliance institutions and organizations.84
Economically, Qatar evolved from its initial branding as an emerging
oil and natural gas powerhouse85 to a state that recognizes the
importance of sustainable resource development, both at home and
abroad, as outlined in their National Vision 2030.
It should be recalled that, with approximately 12,000 staff
members, Qatar’s armed forces are the second smallest in the Middle
East, just slightly ahead of Bahrain.86 Therefore, under its brand as a
Western ally, Qatar has become home to the forward headquarters of
the US Central Command, as well as several American military bases,
including the largest prepositioning base outside the continental United
States.87 Such “efforts” provide a three-fold advantage to the state.
First, it protects Qatar from any immediate regional threat; second,
hosting these bases projects an image of stability abroad;88 and third,
it cements the base upon which Qatar can continue to pursue its soft
power objectives. Indeed, soft power is necessary for this country
because it represents a means of compensating for lack of material and
force-based persuasive capabilities.
4.2 Qatar’s Mechanisms for Soft Power Influence
Beyond the soft power strategy of mediation, the other means by which
Qatar both brands itself and projects its image abroad as a means of
influencing the interests and actions of others should be highlighted.
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The first, and most widely cited, is the state-owned media outlet, Al-
Jazeera. Its creation in 1996 transformed Qatar from a relatively
unknown Gulf State to one with near universal recognition.89 As the
US successfully did with CNN and the United Kingdom with the BBC,
Al-Jazeera has become a wide-reaching means by which Qatar can
successfully diffuse its ideals, values and image abroad.90 Al-Jazeera
now has 65 international bureaus and broadcasts to almost 220 million
households in more than 100 countries.91 Since its inception, the
organization has diversified its coverage to include sport, documen-taries,
local news, children’s programmes and English language networks.92
It was due to its unique coverage of several different events that
Al-Jazeera gained its international notoriety, bringing with it a created
image of Qatar. In 2000, it capitalized on being the only Arab alternative
to coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada and then by being the
first to air video messages by Osama bin Laden after the events of
September 11th.93 Al-Jazeera also effectively used its own branding of
media independence to set itself apart as distinct in a region saturated
by state-controlled media outlets.94 In short, Al-Jazeera acts both as
Qatar’s cultural bridge95 and as a lightning rod to attract the world’s
gaze to this nation,96 thereby establishing an international audience
that can be subsequently wooed via alternative soft power strategies
and mediums.
The positive impact of investing in sport and the hosting of large-
scale megaevents on the state’s international image and prestige shifted
in recent years from being a simply welcome consequence to a significant
justification.97 Governments use elite types of sport, as a cultural
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phenomenon, to achieve foreign policy objectives and, in particular,
that of deploying soft power through which states seek to attract
others.98 Megaevents often serve as a “coming out party” for a country,
which will have a guaranteed global audience for their brand, values
and image.99 Traditionally, Qatar spent considerable effort on the use
of sport as a tool of soft power and image promotion abroad. While
the country is not a sporting powerhouse, fielding a mere 12
competitors in four events during the 2012 Olympic Games,100 it made
every effort to both host and have its name appear in many international
athletic spectacles. Qatar will host 99 sporting events, including 43
international events between 2014 and 2015.101 Five of the latter will
be world championships.102 Qatar’s push to bid for big-ticket
tournaments would seem to be less about the value of the sport itself,
but the use of sport as a strategic tool to promote itself on the world
stage.
Qatar used these global events, including its successful, albeit
controversial, bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, to once again set itself
apart from its regional neighbours. Indeed, since Saudi Arabia, Bahrain
and the United Arab Emirates appear to have no intention of hosting
large-scale sporting events that Qatar has set its sights on, these above-
mentioned countries are focusing on niche markets instead. Qatari
events and sports strategy brought it closer to its Western counterparts
and showcased it as a stable neighbour, host, ally and model for
growth.103 This latter observation relates to what constitutes a unique
tri-directional soft power strategy, which Kamrava termed a balancing
act of cultural, financial and military persuasion in the form of subtle
power on the part of Qatar. Harkening back to its position as a bridge,
Qatar made a conscious and observable effort to play two sides with
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its international relations – as a friend of both the West and the Arab
world. Indeed, it would appear that part of Qatar’s success must be
credited to its flexible or malleable identity – a balancing act between
a tempered Islamic outlook and a domestic approach to law and social
affairs, as well as an often credible linkage to Nye’s universal values,
noted above, regarded as sacred by Western partners.
Apart from the above, Qatar actively uses a number of additional
soft power tools, each of which contributes to its image and persuasive
authority abroad, such as the continued expansion and growing
attractiveness of Qatar Airways; active investment by Qatar’s sovereign
wealth fund into numerous successful brands, including the Volkswagen
Automotive Group, Barclays Bank, Sainsbury supermarkets, Credit
Suisse, Royal Dutch Shell, London’s Olympic Village, Europe’s tallest
building, namely the “Shard” Harrods department store, Miramax Film
Studios and the commodity trading house of Glencore, among others;104
Qatar’s “rags-to-riches” story, as a state growing out of abject poverty
in the 1940s; a progressive and westernized higher education system,
hosted by the Qatar Foundation;105 and substantial efforts in growing
foreign aid,106 as well as the international presence of its not-for-profit
sector.107
4.3 Identifying Results
To summarize, we have thus far explored Qatar’s foreign policy
objectives, expanded on its desire to be an international soft power as
compensation for a small stockpile of hard force utilities, as well as
surveyed the list of soft power tools at its disposal. The tasks that
remain are twofold, namely to identify the results of Qatar’s efforts to
exert influence via image, brand and persuasion in Africa; and second,
to determine the associated problems that Qatar might have throughout
these processes.
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4.4 Sudan
Qatar has a number of high profile examples of successful mediation
on the African continent, based on a number of different soft power
factors. It is important to recall that Qatar was seen to use mediation
efforts as a soft power tool in and of itself, as it seeks to carve out an
image of an experienced mediator with a proven track record, a regional
diplomatic powerhouse, an honest broker and a wise and mature
international player, interested in peace both regionally and globally.108
Beginning with Sudan and Darfur, Qatar was named the Arab League’s
representative to mediate between the government in Khartoum and
rebel factions, after violence between the two had escalated in 2008.109
Negotiations were hosted in Doha, along with mediators from the
African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League and Sudan’s regional
neighbours.110
In spite of several failures to resolve the conflict, a ceasefire
framework agreement was reached in February 2010, whereupon the
Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, declared the conflict to be over.111
In 2011, this was followed by what has been popularly known as the
Doha Peace Agreement, which solidified the previous accord between
Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement. The Norwegian
PeaceBuilding Resource Centre credits this success, albeit temporary,
to several factors attributable to Qatar’s efforts at developing its own
soft power image and persuasive capabilities. First, Qatar made the
negotiations intensely personal, restricting participating mediators from
Doha to the inner circle of the royal family.112 Equally, hosting talks in
Doha was a crucial contribution from Qatar, resulting in an external
perception of Doha as a neutral arena that affected negotiations
positively.113 Second, Qatar used its economic model of state capitalism
for political dividends throughout the peace process, both by
emphasizing its already sizable investments in Sudan, as well as pledging
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113 Sultan Barakat, “The Qatari Spring: Qatar’s Emerging Role in Peacemaking”
(2012) Brookings Institute and the London School of Economics and Political
Science, 20-21.
2017 CONCEPTUALIZING THE QATARI-AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY 81
new infusions of financial resources, including US$500 million for
reconstruction assistance.114
The African Union itself noted that Qatar’s investments in African
countries, including Sudan, actively support the organization’s efforts
in resolving continental conflict and boosting African-Arab economic
cooperation.115 Third and, most important, Qatar is said to have lacked
the problematic historical baggage of the region’s traditional
heavyweights, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia,116 As Sudan had a
troubled relationship with Egypt in particular. Qatar thus successfully
employed its image as an impartial and honest third party to embed
itself into the negotiation process.117
For Qatar, the soft power gains from its mediation efforts in Sudan
were significant both in Africa and elsewhere as it was able to solidify
its position as a viable, attractive and stable alternative diplomatic
player with regard to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular, which was
derived from its situational supplanting of the former; and it was able
to use its successful, friendly image to back efforts to buy up farmland
in Sudan under its National Food Security Programme.118 These
successes are, for Barakat, rooted in a rare legitimacy held by Qatar,
which was brought to the country by strategies of soft power, including
developing a particular brand and linkages to “universal” norms.119
4.5 Somalia
Qatar was also named as one of the leading influential states in Somalia,
via actions that are said to be part of a bigger push for soft power in
the Horn of Africa.120 With a similar strategy to its efforts in Sudan,
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Qatar is placing itself, in contrast to Egypt, as a state with a history of
engagement with Somalia. In 2011, carrot diplomacy seemed to have
been successful with Somalia’s Prime Minister, calling on Qatar to help
achieve reconciliation between the various Somali factions and to assist
with the state’s reconstruction efforts.121 Indeed, Qatar Charity is seen
to be one of the most active not-for-profit organizations operating in
the country, including the launch of dedicated relief programmes during
Somalia’s recent famine.122 While Qatar may not necessarily have
particularly evident foreign policy interests in Somalia, their engagement
here serves to increase the Gulf state’s brand, including local
perspectives of its legitimacy and a positive image, which gives Qatar
an influential foothold in the region.
4.6 Mali and Tunisia
In 2011, France sent military forces to Mali at the request of the local
government to combat the rising threat of Islamic militia in the north
of the country. Shortly thereafter, France began to accuse some of its
allies, including Qatar, of working towards opposite goals. Qatar, it
was argued, had been sending resources and money via its charity
organizations to rebel-held areas in support of radical groups.123 Indeed,
the Qatari Red Crescent was at one point during the conflict the only
humanitarian organization to be granted access to the vast Northern
Malian region.124 Analysis, however, suggests that Qatar’s actions in
Mali represent yet another attempt to build its soft power tool set
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and, in particular for this state, see a return on its investment. Qatar
has, in fact, engaged in carrot public diplomacy since the 1980s,
establishing and funding a wide network of institutions, madrassas,
schools and charities in Mali.125 It would appear as though Qatar’s
primary motivation for supporting the Islamist groups in various ways
was to secure its own long-term business interests and increase its
influence over rapidly changing events in the Muslim world.126 Indeed,
for Qatar to be successful in Mali would mean a considerable boost in
influence in Western Africa and the Sahel. Equally, Mali has extremely
large deposits of oil and gas, as well as rare minerals, including gold
and uranium.127 For a country like Qatar, its future security lies beyond
its borders, via soft power influence, alliance building, and material
investments. This strategy, operational as of July 2014, would appear
to have been successful, as Mali recently awarded four mining
exploration permits to Qatar.128
Another African state bearing witness to Qatar’s rise in soft power,
coupled with carrot diplomacy, is Tunisia. Qatar has invested
substantially in Tunisia since the end of the Arab Spring, including
US$500 million to support Tunisia’s reserve currency129 and the
acquisition of a majority stake in major telecom and banking
institutions.130 Indeed, while Qatar’s image continues to grow in Tunisia,
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with a related improvement in soft power, some observers suggested
that Qatar’s influence in Northern Africa is similar to “ruling by remote
control.”131
5.  PROBLEMS
Unfortunately, Qatar’s pristine reputation as a neutral broker of world
conflict, crises and affairs, may have been muddied in recent years,
due to several factors. The first is what I conceptualize as “failed soft
power investments”. As a firm on Wall Street might invest in a particular
company, enterprise or resource and, as that investment might fail to
return dividends or place that firm in a position less favourable than
before, so too could countries make inappropriate soft power
investments in opportunities that fail to produce targeted results. Qatar,
in its quest to achieve soft power greatness, lost its critical balance of
neutrality along the way, pushing further towards Islamic organizations
that fail the test of universal values, as set out in the West. What are
these failed investments? There is Qatar’s apparent support of African
Islamists, namely Somalia’s al-Shabab insurgents, who were linked to
numerous attacks in Somalia and Kenya.132  Furthermore, Israel charged
that Qatar provided unbalanced financial support to Hamas in Gaza –
a charge that Qatar denied.133 Qatar made a significant soft power
investment in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, shortly after the overthrow
of former President Hosni Mubarak.134 Unfortunately for Qatar, shortly
thereafter Egypt was once again thrown into turmoil and the Muslim
Brotherhood was declared an illegal organization, leaving its soft power
benefactor with a reputational bruise.
Qatar also finds itself in the difficult position of promoting universal
Nye-esk values abroad but failing to practice them at home. A case in
point is democracy. Qatar acts as its benevolent messenger
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internationally, but domestically it has been ranked near the bottom
of The Economist’s Economic Intelligence Unit Democracy Index.135 For
Nye, promoting a set of political values could be a major boost to soft
power influence, but only when the promoter adheres to them both at
home and abroad and pursues foreign policies regarded as legitimate
and having moral authority.136 In short, Qatar’s efforts abroad may end
up lacking in substance as it fails to “lead by example.”137
Qatar may realize that there are limits to its carrot diplomacy or
soft power bolstered by financial and resource inducements. For Nye,
when you can get others to admire your ideals and get them to do
what you would like them to do, then you should not have to spend
much on sticks or carrots to move them in the direction of your choice.138
For Antwi-Boateng, Qatar, as a new state with a malleable identity and
developing priorities, is not universally identified with a particular set
of values or ideals that others will voluntarily embrace without
inducements – therefore the question is, what would happen if and
when Qatar runs out of “carrots” to bolster its diplomacy and soft
power?
Along a similar line of thought, Khatib argues that Qatar’s foreign
policy is not based on a cohesive political strategy but rather seems to
be perpetually playing catch-up with political trends in being reactive
to them rather than setting the international normative agenda.139 Qatar
needs to be the first state to espouse a particular perspective attractive
to others, rather than simply falling in line.
Finally, in terms of its quintessential soft power strategy of
mediation, Qatar seemingly lacks the administrative and on-the-ground
resources to translate initial agreements into sustainable resolutions
of disputes.140 Its current diplomatic service is too small to follow up
or monitor progress towards implementation after negotiations have
ended, meaning that, in cases such as Darfur, Qatar’s efforts were more
about bridging surface divisions rather than actually addressing deeper
structural concerns.141 Even those results could be considered as short-
lived. Khatib notes that, while Qatar’s diplomatic endeavours were
135 Osman  (n 89)47.
136 ibid 47-48.
137 ibid  48.
138 ibid.
129 Fitch (n 72) 429.
140 Gulf Times (n 117) 3.
141 ibid.
86 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
traditionally hailed as successful, their effect has generally been limited
to the short-term.142 Thus, for Qatar to truly become an authoritative
and effective soft power, evoking meaningful and long-lasting change,
the above difficulties and lessons learned must be taken to account.
5.1 Alternative Strategies
If Qatar fails in its soft power approach by gaining only limited
international prestige and influence – are there alternative strategies
that it could pursue? This article proposes at least two. The first is
“smart power”, a term credited to Nye and Suzanne Nossel.143 Smart
power is defined as neither hard nor soft power, but rather the “skilful
combination of both”. It is the development of an integrated strategy,
resource base and a tool-kit to achieve foreign policy objectives drawing
on both types of power.144 It is an approach that recognizes the need
for both an effective military and economic resources set, but is also
heavily invested in the belief that alliances, partnerships and the
development of a recognizable and desired image abroad, associated
with clear, universal values and norms, is crucially necessary.145 Smart
power equally understands that every dollar spent on hard power will
not necessarily bring with it a dollar’s worth of security.146 In the words
of Nye, smart power is the exporting of optimism, not fear.147
In several ways, it would appear as though Qatar might have already
started to move down a path of smart power. While this article focused
on soft power initiatives and principles, the other half of the smart
power equation appears to have established some roots. Qatar started
to deepen its cooperation with NATO and Western militaries, as can be
seen during the former’s recent sortie to Libya.148 Qatar recently signed
a 10-year defence cooperation agreement with the United States (as
well as playing host to its military bases); and, it has begun to upgrade
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and update its hard power equipment via deals with both the US and
France, while continuing its pursuit of soft power influence.149
The second alternative strategy for Qatar could be to follow in the
footsteps of the European Union and become what some term as a
“normative power” or civilian power. The notion of normative power
largely rests within a discussion of the power over opinion, an idée-
force or ideological power.150 Looking at it in another way, normative
power has the potential to influence activities via the power of norms,
shaping what constitutes both the domain and range of legitimate
behaviour for other actors.151 Normative power is the ability to frame
what is acceptable and what is not – both internationally and in the
domestic context of another state.152 Jackson argues that, while the
ability to define normality might be the ultimate source of power in
the international system, the legitimacy of those definitions is not
assumed, but it must rather be earned.153
Evidently, normative power must rest on what Manners terms a
country’s normative basis, typically developed via policy, culture and
society over a non-specific period of time.154 For example, the European
Union, as an organization, has spent nearly 50 years building its
normative basis that provides a centrality for peace, liberty, democracy,
respect for the rule of law and the protection of human rights.155 But
having a normative base is not sufficient to be considered a normative
power – instead, there should be efforts to diffuse those norms abroad,
resulting in an explicit or implicit change in a targeted recipient. Manners
argues that there are at least six means by which this diffusion can
occur, namely contagion; the unintentional diffusion of norms from
one actor to another; informational or diffusion via a range of strategic
communications; procedural, as in the institutionalization of a relation-
ship between states; transference, via the exchange of goods, aid or
technical assistance; overt diffusion or the physical presence of State A
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in State B; and a cultural filter, based on the interplay between the
creation of knowledge, namely the social and political learning in third
states.156 Perhaps then, if Qatar can continue to differentiate itself from
its regional neighbours by its ability to balance religious obligations
with universal/western interests and ideology both domestically and
abroad, it could solidify itself as a legitimate normative model that can
influence others.
A third and final alternative strategy group, albeit one that can
play a collaborative role with soft power above, is the use of various
emerging forms of diplomacy, such as networking; celebrities entering
the ring; and the presence of guerrilla forces. Networking diplomacy,
as opposed to club diplomacy, uses a less hierarchical model of
interaction in which diplomats engage with a vastly larger number of
players in the host country, which becomes particularly crucial when a
state is attempting to diffuse a particular image or brand of itself over
a much wider, globalized society as a means of gaining soft power.157
The second is celebrity diplomacy or the participation of well-known,
pre-branded individuals who participate in everything from formal
negotiations between states to the increase of public awareness in
terms of a particular issue.158 Celebrity involvement in diplomatic
activities is attractive, as they are able to find a populist recognition
and legitimacy that they are unable to cultivate on their own and,
once within traditional spheres of negotiations, they can advance
particular agendas directly with state leadership.159 Finally, there is
guerrilla diplomacy, or the veritable boots-on-the-ground diplomacy, once
reserved for the world of human intelligence operatives, whereby
diplomats would provide the vital functions of networking, advocacy
and an analysis of crucial events for their home state via non-traditional
mediums, such as a storefront presence, temporary missions, co-location
with suitable partners, the use of large expatriate communities for
brand diffusion and the expansion of honorary consuls.160
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6.  CONCLUSION
Qatar has shown emerging international power as a small Gulf State
with substantial hard economic resources. There appears to be,
however, an inconsistency in Qatar’s foreign policy associated with
soft power objectives and definitions. While Qatar has an extensive
soft power toolset, each power tool is designed to extend a welcoming
and attractive brand or image abroad as a means of persuading targeted
states to move closer to Qatar. An examination of available evidence
outlining Qatar’s attempted soft power actions on the African continent
did indeed highlight its significant use, albeit from a slightly different
angle than its western soft power predecessors. It primarily uses what
is termed as carrot diplomacy or the influencing of others, backed by
material and financial resource inducements. This article identified five
problems and roadblocks affecting Qatar’s approach to international
relations, which was followed by alternative power-based strategies,
which could be explored by its governing bodies.
While Qatar may already possess significant soft power, including
on the African continent, such power was created primarily via hard
financial investments rather than an image associated with desirable
universal values. Therefore, the key will be for Qatar to sustainably
invest in its future soft power image, in the same way it did for future
food and economic security. Using the available time and resources to
build an attractive reputation, non-reliant on the continued influx of
material resources, avoiding an imbalance of polarized normative camps;
creating for itself a distinct brand associated with universal values
practiced abroad and at home; and adhering to the lessons presented,
may very well be the path that leads to an international respect for
Qatar – long after its cheques can no longer be signed.
